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ABSTRACT
This Article is a legal-political examination of two of the most
consequential elements in contemporary relations between the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China on
Taiwan (ROC)—the controversial “1992 Consensus” and the
remarkable cross-strait agreements that the ROC and the PRC have
concluded, especially the 23 made between 2008 and 2015 when then
President Ma Ying-jeou’s Nationalist Party (KMT) governed Taiwan.
Political developments have inextricably interlinked these two
elements, leading to the present crisis in cross-strait relations that
developed when the ROC’s current president, Tsai Ing-wen, led her
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to electoral victory over the
KMT in 2016. Tsai has refused to endorse the so-called “1992
Consensus”, a strategic political formula that implied that Taiwan is
part of China. The PRC’s response has been to suspend all official
contacts with the new ROC government, to cease or limit
implementation of many of the cross-strait agreements and
increasingly to mobilize a range of other pressures designed to
coerce the new ROC government to adopt the “1992 Consensus”.
By briefly referring to the domestic legal systems of the
parties as well as international law, we seek to clarify the nature of
the parties’ momentous dispute and to evaluate their respective
positions. We question whether there ever was a genuine “1992
Consensus” and whether it should be regarded as a binding legal
commitment. The fiction of “consensus” was in fact a political
strategy constructed after the fact to allow the KMT and the Chinese
Communist Party governments to shelve their differing positions
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concerning which government is the legitimate, exclusive
representative of “China”, so that they could negotiate the more
immediate challenges of concluding binding agreements on various
practical subjects.
The cross-strait agreements concluded by the parties
imaginatively resorted to supposedly “unofficial” proxies to make
cooperation on an equal footing possible between two governments
that refuse to recognize each other. Although for political reasons
neither the PRC nor the ROC considers cross-strait agreements to
fall within the province of international law, since the domestic laws
and legal systems of the parties cannot provide impartial resolution
of their dispute, we find it appropriate to assess their agreements by
applying international legal principles, either directly or by analogy.
In accordance with international legal principles and practice, we
argue that all the cross-strait agreements that have been formally
authorized by each side should be deemed to be legally binding. We
further recommend some modest steps that can be undertaken by the
ROC toward diminishing the crisis and promoting a rule-based,
sustainable order across the Taiwan Strait.
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INTRODUCTION1
When the former president of the Republic of China on
Taiwan (ROC or Taiwan) Ma Ying-jeou was in office from 2008 to
2016, Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China)
initiated a groundbreaking series of measures fostering political
reconciliation. Taipei and Beijing, through their respective proxies—
Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China’s
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS)—
signed no fewer than 23 cross-strait agreements designed to facilitate
cooperation in multiple areas, including transportation, tourism,
judicial assistance, trade, investment and safety.2
Yet Taiwanese dissatisfaction with the policy of Ma’s
Kuomintang (KMT) government to minimize domestic popular and
legislative participation in cross-strait agreements, combined with a
1 This Article was completed in December 2018. The speeches of Xi Jinping and Tsai
Ing-wen for the New Year of 2019 concerning China-Taiwan relations vindicate our analysis
about the divergent views of the “1992 Consensus.” These speeches, together with the
response from the Kuomintang (KMT) rejecting Xi’s proposal of “One Country, Two
Systems,” make it ever clearer that there was no genuine “consensus” about sovereignty
issues disputed by the PRC and ROC governments. Notably, Xi Jinping’s remarks, linking
“One Country, Two Systems” with the “1992 Consensus,” depart from China’s previous
implicit practice not to publicly challenge the KMT’s position of “One China, Respective
Interpretations.” See Xi Jinping, Wei Shixian Minzu Weida Fuxing Tuijin Zuguo Heping
Tongyi er Gongtong Fendou--Zai “Gao Taiwan Tongbao Shu” Fabiao Sishi Zhounian Jinian
Hui Shang de Jianghua (為實現民族偉大復興推進祖國和平統一而共同奮鬥——在《告
台灣同胞書》發表 40 週年紀念會上的講話) [Jointly Strive to Fulfill Great Rejuvenation
of the Chinese Nation and Promote Peaceful Unification of the Motherland--Speech at the
40th Anniversary of “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”], Jan. 2, 2019, Xinhua,
www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-01/02/c_1123937757.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZB6M-HJCK]; President Tsai Issues Statement on China’s President Xi’s
“Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”, Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan),
Jan. 2, 2019,
https://english.president.gov.tw/News/5621; Zhongguo Guomindang Shengming (中國國
民黨聲明) [Statement of the KMT], Kuomintang, Jan. 3, 2019,
www.kmt.org.tw/2019/01/blog-post_3.html [https://perma.cc/D3Q7-AHNM].
For our evaluation of the “1992 Consensus,” see infra Section I.
2 For a list of the cross-strait agreements, see the website of the ROC Mainland Affairs
Council, Liang’an Xieyi (兩岸協議),
MAINLAND AFF. COUNCIL OF THE EXECUTIVE YUAN ROC (TAIWAN) [hereinafter Cross-strait
Agreements],
https://www.mac.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=1494D59CE74DF095 [https://perma.cc/QD3J-ACNG]
(last visited Aug. 14, 2018) (in Chinese language); Liang’an Xiangguan Xieyi (兩岸相關協
議), TAIWAN AFF. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL PRC [hereinafter Relevant Cross-strait
Agreements], www.gwytb.gov.cn/lhjl/laxy/ [https://perma.cc/7TTN-DDBP] (last visited
Aug. 14, 2018) (in Chinese language).
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growing Taiwan identity and generally increasing anxiety over ties
with Beijing, eventually resulted in Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement
in March 2014.3 The trigger point for this protest was the KMT’s
effort to push the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement through the
legislature after the opposition party, the Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP), had filibustered it for nearly a year. Angry with this
KMT maneuver, student activists stormed into and occupied the
legislative chamber for 24 days. More than half a million Taiwanese
protestors took to the streets to support the students’ demands to put
more effective legislative checks on cross-strait cooperation,
particularly the signing and implementation of cross-strait
agreements.
After the end of the Sunflower Movement, Beijing-Taipei
relations gradually cooled. Even an unprecedented meeting between
the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi
Jinping, and Ma Ying-jeou in Singapore in 2015,4 the first between
the political leaders of China and Taiwan since the Chinese civil war
ended on the Mainland over six decades earlier, was unable to revive
the declining interaction. In addition, the KMT suffered major
electoral setbacks, losing to the DPP the local elections in November
2014 and the island-wide legislative and presidential elections in
2016.5
The new DPP President, Tsai Ing-wen, has advocated a
moderate stand on cross-strait relations.6 Unlike the first DPP leader
3

See generally Ian Rowen, Inside Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement: Twenty-Four Days
in a Student-Occupied Parliament, and the Future of the Region, 74 J. OF ASIAN STUD. 1, 5
(Feb. 2015); MICHAEL COLE, BLACK ISLAND: TWO YEARS OF ACTIVISM IN TAIWAN (2015);
LAW AND POLITICS OF THE TAIWAN SUNFLOWER AND HONG KONG UMBRELLA MOVEMENTS
(Brian Christopher Jones ed., 2017).
4 One-minute Handshake Marks Historic Meeting between Xi Jinping and Ma Yingjeou, THE STRAIT TIMES (Jan. 19, 2016, 3:51 PM),
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/one-minute-handshake-marks-historic-meetingbetween-xi-jinping-and-ma-ying-jeou [https://perma.cc/33HW-B9BK].
5 Min-Hua Huang, Taiwan’s Changing Political Landscape: The KMT’s Landslide
Defeat in the Nine-in-One Elections, BROOKINGS (Dec. 8, 2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/taiwans-changing-political-landscape-the-kmtslandslide-defeat-in-the-nine-in-one-elections/ [https://perma.cc/8BZN-PVKE];
Aube Rey Lescure, Taiwan’s 2016 Election in Review, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L
PEACE (Jan. 26, 2016), https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/26/taiwan-s-2016-electionin-review-pub-62586 [https://perma.cc/UKN3-4XHN].
6 Douglas Paal, China, the U.S. and the Coming Taiwan Transition, THE DIPLOMAT
(Dec. 29, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/china-the-u-s-and-the-coming-taiwantransition/ [https://perma.cc/3YPM-RU9M];
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elected to the presidency, Chen Shui-bian, who served from 2000 to
2008 and who became increasingly controversial because of his
apparent interest in declaring Taiwan’s de jure independence,7 Tsai
claims to be maintaining the status quo and has called on Beijing to
continue cooperation with Taipei.8
Beijing, however, has rejected Tsai’s conciliatory policy. It
has used various non-cooperative and even coercive political,
economic and military tactics, including minimizing the
implementation of the existing cross-strait agreements, to pressure
Tsai Ing-wen to recognize the so-called “1992 Consensus,” which
Ma’s KMT government had embraced. 9 Beijing considers Tsai’s
explicit endorsement of the “1992 Consensus” to be the essential
prerequisite to the PRC’s continuing implementation of cross-strait
agreements.10
Cross-strait relations are crucial to the stability of the Asian
region as well as the U.S. relationships with China and Taiwan. This
Article focuses on the two most important, interlinked aspects of
current cross-strait relations—the controversial “1992 Consensus”
and the impressive cross-strait agreements. A precise understanding
and assessment of China’s and Taiwan’s positions on cross-strait
relations requires analysis of the legal as well as political meaning of
these two distinctive and crucial aspects.
We proceed as follows: Part I investigates the basis and legalpolitical significance of the “1992 Consensus.” Part II discusses the
innovative achievements and legal nature of the cross-strait
agreements. It introduces the recent dispute over the “1992
Consensus” that has adversely affected the full implementation of the
cross-strait agreements and explores the role of law in attempts to
Fang-long Shih, Not Vague, But Moderate: the Political Philosophy in President Tsai Ingwen’s Inaugural Address, LSE TAIWAN RESEARCH PROGRAMME (May 26, 2016),
www.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/units/TaiwanProgramme/Statements/Not-VagueBut-Moderate.aspx [https://perma.cc/NK7K-VTJD]; A Year in Office, Taiwan’s Tsai Ingwen Faces Surge in Anti-China Sentiment, THE STRAIT TIMES (May 19, 2017),
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/a-year-in-office-taiwans-tsai-ing-wen-facessurge-in-anti-china-sentiment [https://perma.cc/8UZ3-K2XM].
7 Chien-Min Chao, One Step Forward, One Step Backward: Chen Shuibian’s
Mainland Policy, 12 J. OF CONTEMP. CHINA 125 (2003).
8 Tsai Calls for Cooperation to Ensure Peace, Stability in Asia-Pacific, TAIWAN
TODAY (Jan. 10, 2018), https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2,6,10,15,18&post=127784
[https://perma.cc/DEH5-P5TS].
9 See discussion infra Sections II and III.
10 See discussion infra Section II.
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resolve the dispute. Part III discusses the broader political
approaches of the two sides toward cooperation, including China’s
non-compliance with cross-strait agreements and recent tactics to
mount pressure on Tsai Ing-wen’s government. Part IV’s Conclusion
reflects our evaluation of not only the claims and actions of the parties
regarding the “1992 Consensus” and the cross-strait agreements, but
also the implications of their current stalemate. Finally, we offer our
comments about the role that law might play in enhancing prospects
for a more peaceful and sustainable cross-strait future.
I. THE “1992 CONSENSUS”
A.

The significance of the “Consensus”

The “1992 Consensus” is a formula that supposedly
encapsulated an agreement allegedly reached by the proxies of the
ROC and PRC governments in 1992. 11 Beijing considers the
“Consensus” crucial to its “One China Principle,” which it interprets
to mean that there is only one China in the world, that Taiwan is part
of China and that the PRC is the only legitimate government that
represents the whole of China.12 It insists that Tsai Ing-wen explicitly
endorse the “Consensus,” which implicitly excludes the possibility of
Taiwan’s independence from China.
This is why the “Consensus” is frequently stressed in
Beijing’s political narrative. At the 19th Congress of the CCP in
October 2017, Xi Jinping stated: “(T)he 1992 Consensus embodies
the One-China principle and defines the fundamental nature of crossstrait relations.” 13 Subsequently, the new head of the PRC State
11

“YIGE ZHONGGUO GEZI BIAOSHU” GONGSHI DE SHISHI (「一個中國，各自表述」
共識的史實) [“ONE CHINA, WITH RESPECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS”—A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT
OF THE CONSENSUS OF 1992] I-VIII (Chi Su & An-kuo Cheng eds., 2002) [hereinafter A
HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE CONSENSUS OF 1992]; CHI SU, TAIWAN’S RELATIONS WITH
MAINLAND CHINA: A TAIL WAGGING TWO DOGS 12-15 (2009).
12 Yige Zhongguo de Yuanze yu Taiwan Wenti Baipishu (一個中國的原則與台灣問
題 白 皮 書 ) [White Paper—the One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue], PRC
GOVERNMENT, (Jan. 21, 2000),
http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2000/Document/307945/307945.htm.http://www.scio.g
ov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2000/Document/307945/307945.htm [https://perma.cc/C5VV-9MKH].
13 Opening Ceremony of the 19th Chinese Communist Party National Congress (Oct.
17, 2017),
live.china.org.cn/2017/10/17/opening-ceremony-of-the-19th-cpc-national-congress/
[https://perma.cc/GE8D-XCFQ].
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Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, Liu Jieyi, in meeting with a KMT—
not DPP—delegation in March 2018 for the first time, reiterated that
the “1992 Consensus” embodies the “One China Principle” and
“opposes Taiwanese independence schemes in any form.” 14 In
Beijing’s view, the “One China Principle” is non-negotiable15 and is
the basis for all countries to develop diplomatic ties with China; “no
country can be an exception to this rule.”16
Unlike her predecessor Ma Ying-jeou, Tsai Ing-wen has not
recognized the existence of the “1992 Consensus.”17 Yet, she has
tried to reach a middle ground between Beijing’s stance and that of
her own party, the DPP. In her inaugural speech, she carefully
worded her position, acknowledging the first meeting between SEF
and ARATS in 1992 as “historical fact.”18 She stated that the meeting
had “arrived at various joint acknowledgments and understandings”
and was conducted “in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political
attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences,”19
a phrase often used by Beijing. She added that, “it is based on such
existing realities and political foundations that the stable and peaceful
development of the cross-strait relationship must be continuously
promoted.”20 In other words, while Tsai did not accept the “1992
Consensus,” she acknowledged that the 1992 meeting took place in a
positive spirit that should lay the groundwork for sustaining crossstrait peace.
14 Lai Hsiao-tung, Chung Li-hua & Sherry Hsiao, Chu Meets New Boss of China’s TAO,
TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018),
www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2018/03/27/2003690114
[https://perma.cc/AZ38-JLBP].
15 Willy Worley, One China Principle is Not Negotiable, Foreign Ministry Says in
Response to Donald Trump Comments, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 15, 2017, 9:34 AM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/one-china-principle-non-negotiabledonald-trump-comments-taiwan-tsai-ing-wen-a7527761.html
[https://perma.cc/A8QL-XPYK].
16 China Says No Country Can Be Exception to ‘One China’ Principle, REUTERS (Dec.
15, 2016, 8:18 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-china-taiwan/china-saysno-country-can-be-exception-to-one-china-principle-idUSKBN145053
[https://perma.cc/D6BV-NJL3].
17 Eleanor Albert, China-Taiwan Relations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (June 15, 2018),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations [https://perma.cc/3UQN-FJUG].
18 President Tsai Ing-wen, Inaugural Presidential Address, FOCUS TAIWAN (May 20,
2016, 11:49 AM), focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201605200008.aspx [https://perma.cc/7ZADCTMD].
19 Id.
20 Id.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol14/iss1/2

2019]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.
B.

9

Fiction or reality? Consensus or dissensus?

Why are there different views with regard to the “1992
Consensus”?21 Was there ever a “consensus” reached in 1992? After
all, the term “1992 Consensus” was only coined in 2000 by Su Chi—
the KMT’s then Chairman of the ROC Executive Yuan’s Mainland
Affairs Council (MAC).22 Su claimed this consensus could be found
in the 1992 exchanges between SEF and ARATS.23 SEF and ARATS
had been set up in November 1990 and December 1991, respectively,
as “non-governmental,” “white-glove” organizations in order to
enable them to negotiate and sign cross-strait agreements, because
their respective governments were unwilling to have “official”
contact with each other.24
In March 1992, the representatives of SEF and ARATS met
in Beijing to discuss technical matters including document
authentication, tracing of registered mail, and compensation for lost
mail.25 ARATS insisted that SEF make a statement on “One China”,
while SEF held that the technical matters under negotiation should
not involve political discussion.26
The two organizations met again in Hong Kong from October
28 to October 30, 1992. During lengthy discussions, neither
organization could agree to the various formulas proposed by the
other side to describe the cross-strait political situation.27 Before the
representatives parted, SEF suggested that each organization orally
21

See generally SU, supra note 11; Tong Zhenyuan (童振源) [Tung Cheng-yuan] &
Chen Shuoting (陳碩廷) [Chen Shuo-ting], Jiuer Gongshi de Xingcheng, Shijian yu Wajie
(九二共識的形成、實踐與瓦解) [The Formation, Implementation and Dissolution of the
1992 Consensus], 2 ZHANWANG YU TANSUO (展望與探索) [Prospect and Exploration] 33;
Alan D. Romberg, The “1992 Consensus”—Adapting to the Future?, 49 CHINA LEADERSHIP
MONITOR (2016),
https://www.hoover.org/research/1992-consensus-adapting-future [https://perma.cc/3TW23E3S].
22 Tung & Chen, supra note 21, at 34.
23 SU, supra note 11.
24 In exercising the public authority entrusted by the Taiwan government, SEF is
supervised by the MAC, a full-fledged, official cabinet-level administrative agency in charge
of the planning and implementation of policies toward Mainland China, Hong Kong and
Macau. ARATS is authorized to cooperate with SEF by the Taiwan Work Office of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the
State Council of the PRC Government.
25 Tung & Chen, supra note 21, at 36.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 37.
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state its own position regarding “One China”, but no conclusion was
reached.28
SEF sought to end the stalemate a few days later by issuing a
press release and sending ARATS a letter on November 3, 1992,
stating that “it is acceptable if the two sides orally state their own
positions separately.” 29 SEF added that its own position is in
accordance with the National Unification Guidelines and the
resolution made on August 1, 1992 by the ROC’s National
Unification Council. This referred to a resolution that defined the
Taiwanese government’s position on “One China.”30 The resolution
stated that “both sides of the Strait insist on the principle of ‘One
China,’ but the two sides have different views regarding its meaning.”
It went on to explain the difference, stating that, from the viewpoint
of the Communist authorities, “One China” refers to the PRC, but
from the viewpoint of the ROC, “One China” refers to the ROC.31
ARATS reportedly responded the same day with a telephone
call, informing SEF that it “fully respected and accepted” SEF’s
suggestion.”32 On November 16 the same year, ARATS sent a formal
letter to SEF, again stating that ARATS “fully respects and accepts
your Foundation’s suggestion.”33 It added that the oral statement that
ARATS would make would note that, “both sides of the Taiwan Strait
insist on the principle of one China, seeking the unification of the
nation; but the functional negotiations of cross-strait matters do not
involve the political meaning of one China.”34
These fragmentary exchanges were later relied upon by those
who claimed the existence of the “1992 Consensus.” 35 When the
KMT’s Su Chi coined the term, what he reportedly had in mind was
28

Id.
A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE CONSENSUS OF 1992, supra note 11, at 25-28; SU,
supra note 11, at 1.
30 A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE CONSENSUS OF 1992, supra note 11, at 32; SU, supra
note 11, at 13; Tung & Chen, supra note 21, at 37.
31 A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE CONSENSUS OF 1992, supra note 11, at 32.
32 SU, supra note 11, at 13-14; Tung & Chen, supra note 21, at 37-38.
33 A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE CONSENSUS OF 1992, supra note 11, at 42-46; SU,
supra note 11, at 14; Tung & Chen, supra note 21, at 38.
34 Id.
35 SU, supra note 11, at 14; see also President Ma Ying-jeou, Remarks in Meeting with
Mainland Chinese Leader Xi Jinping, MAINLAND AFF. COUNCIL OF THE EXECUTIVE YUAN
ROC (TAIWAN) (Nov. 9, 2015),
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=2BA0753CBE348412&sms=E828F60
C4AFBAF90&s=4F225A4BA95218E4) [https://perma.cc/6EWM-RH22].
29
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the formula of “One China, Respective Interpretations” (Yige
Zhongguo Gezi Biaoshu 一個中國，各自表述, OCRI).36 In Su’s
formulation, the “Consensus” at best can be understood as a formula
to implicitly agree that there is only “one China” and that Taiwan is
part of that “China” but to disagree about which government is the
legitimate, exclusive representative of that “China.” 37 In the
interpretation of the KMT’s ROC Government, “one China” means
the ROC, not the PRC.
By contrast, in Beijing’s current narrative, the “1992
Consensus” embodies its own “One China Principle,” which
emphasizes the PRC as the only legitimate government that
represents the whole of China, including Taiwan, 38 without
acknowledging that the Taiwan side may have a different
interpretation. In the PRC’s view, the phrase “respective
interpretations” in the OCRI formula should not exist. Indeed, from
1995 to 1998, when cross-strait relations were at a low point, the PRC
denied there was ever a consensus about OCRI.39
Despite this difference, SEF and ARATS, after the November
1992 exchanges, proceeded to negotiate cooperation. In April 1993,
the SEF chairman, Koo Chen-fu, and the ARATS chairman, Wang
Daohan, held groundbreaking talks in Singapore and formally signed
four agreements—the Agreement on Document Authentication, the
Agreement on Tracing of and Compensation for Lost Registered Mail,
the Agreement on the Establishment of Systematic Liaison and
Communication Channels between the SEF and ARATS, and the
Koo-Wang Talks Joint Agreement.40 These instruments paved the
way for later regular negotiations and cooperation between SEF and
ARATS.

36

SU, supra note 11, at 14.
Id.
38 Mainland Stresses One-China Principle in Relations with Taiwan, XINHUA NEWS
(Tian Shaohui ed. July 17, 2016),
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/17/c_135519622.htm
[https://perma.cc/45XC-HEVT].
39 Tung & Chen, supra note 21, at 43.
40 Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, MAINLAND AFF. COUNCIL OF THE EXECUTIVE
YUAN ROC (TAIWAN) (July 29, 1994),
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=8A319E37A32E01EA&sms=2413CFE
1BCE87E0E&s=D6A36C53F3FB9CC1 [https://perma.cc/774S-A38L].
37
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Legal-political evaluation of the 1992 SEF-ARATS
exchanges

How should we evaluate the November 1992 SEF-ARATS
exchanges from a legal perspective? First of all, neither Beijing nor
Taipei has officially characterized its relations with the other side in
terms of international law. Indeed, they have both denied its direct
applicability. Yet, as we will note again in Part II, their respective
domestic laws have little to offer regarding settlement of disputes
relating to cross-strait agreements. Taipei, taking advantage of the
fact that the world community has not yet vindicated Beijing’s claim
that Taiwan is part of China,41 may ultimately alter its position and
formally invoke international law in this context. Even if it does not,
this should not prevent foreign governments and international
organizations, as well as scholars and other observers, from assessing
the legal nature of cross-strait relations and related controversies with
the helpful lens of international law. Indeed, some experts on both
sides of the Strait have already done so.
Under international law, the 1992 SEF-ARATS exchanges
would not amount to a legally binding agreement on the meaning of
“One China” and other sovereignty questions. While SEF and
ARATS apparently possessed the capacity to represent their own
governments in concluding agreements on cross-strait cooperation,
the intention 42 of each organization was to sign legal instruments
41 FRANK CHIANG, THE ONE-CHINA POLICY: STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND TAIWAN’S
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS 282 (2017) (“The United Nations has no official policy that
maintains that China has the title to the island of Taiwan or China has sovereignty over the
inhabitants of Taiwan.”); LUNG-CHU CHEN, THE U.S.-TAIWAN-CHINA RELATIONSHIP IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 79 (2016) (“General Assembly Resolution 2758, which
recognized the PRC as the only legal government of China, did not go so far as to recognize
that Taiwan was an integral part of China.”). Additionally, observers have long noted that
the One-China policy of the United States is not the same as the PRC’s One-China principle.
See Richard C. Bush, A One-China Policy Primer, 10 EAST ASIA POL’Y PAPER 1, 3 (Mar.
2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/one-china-policy-primer.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E2Y6-USFF] (“The One-China policy contains more elements, such as the
U.S. interest in a peaceful process of cross-Strait dispute resolution, and its differing
interpretation of Taiwan’s legal status as compared to Beijing’s interpretation.”); Pasha L.
Hsieh, The Taiwan Question and the One-China Policy: Legal Challenges with Renewed
Momentum, 84 J. OF INT’L PEACE & ORG. 59, 71 (2009) (“The key difference between the
stances of the PRC and the US is that the latter has never recognized the PRC’s sovereignty
over Taiwan.”).
42 See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 41 (Oliver Dörr
& Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2018) (noting that whether there is intention can be decided
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recording their agreement on the specific matters under negotiation,
such as document authentication and registered mail. The parties
never evinced an intention to conclude an agreement on sovereignty
matters involving the notion of “One China” precisely because they
could not reach agreement on the thorny issues involved. Instead,
they bypassed the “One China” issues and went on to conclude formal
written agreements on technical matters.
In other words, the element of intent to create legal
obligations on sovereignty questions did not exist.43 This is evident
from the caution of SEF—it carefully avoided committing itself to a
written agreement with regard to the all-important political issue and
suggested that each side orally state its differing position separately.
This poses a contrast with the formal agreements later concluded by
the two organizations on various economic and technical matters.44
None of these cross-strait agreements touched upon the “One China”
issue, and all were concluded without regard to it.
Without the necessary element of consensus ad idem to effect
any binding obligation, these exchanges in 1992 between SEF and
ARATS would not constitute a “treaty” under the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)45 nor any other type of legally binding
obligation under customary international law. There was never a
meeting of the minds regarding the “One China” notion.
Su Chi claimed that these exchanges were an “exchange of
notes,” 46 which, he maintained, represents the views expressed
regarding certain issues and is “politically binding to a certain
degree.” 47 Yet it is unclear what “politically binding to a certain
degree” means in this context, and it certainly is not equivalent to
“legally binding”.48 After all, political policies are, at most, policies
that can be changed, while a treaty or other international agreement
with view to the drafting history, the language of the agreement and the circumstances of its
conclusion as well as the subsequent practice).
43 See id. (noting that “if the intent of the parties to be legally bound under international
law cannot be determined on the basis of objective criteria, it has to be assumed that no legal
relations have been established.”).
44 See sources cited supra note 2.
45 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8
I.L.M. 679.
46 SU, supra note 11, at 14.
47 Id.
48 Certainly, an “exchange of notes” is capable of generating binding legal obligations
on states, but, as discussed above, evidence does not support the existence of the intent as
such and there was no “consensus” in terms of both acceding to a certain position.
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creates obligations that should be fulfilled under international law in
the absence of valid legal justification or resort to termination or
amendment procedures.
The “1992 Consensus” must be understood as a formula
strategically constructed after the fact to allow the KMT and the CCP
governments to shelve their differing positions concerning which
government is the legitimate, exclusive representative of “China”, so
that they could proceed to cooperation. The formula is thus not a
consensus in any meaningful sense.
The KMT and the CCP disagreed on the crucial political
questions before them, but neither wished to publicly confront the
other, thus enabling them to move on to negotiation of more
immediate issues. This delicate strategy later allowed SEF and
ARATS to again steer away from political discussion and sign 23
cross-strait agreements from 2008 to 2015. Their resort to the fiction
of the “1992 Consensus” is a remarkable demonstration of what
Holmes Welch, a shrewd observer of the Chinese scene, fifty years
ago termed “the Chinese art of make believe.”49 This fiction was
designed to conceal what was in reality a dissensus!
By contrast, the new DPP government does not accept the
existence of a “1992 Consensus.”50 Nor does it approve either the
KMT’s formula of OCRI, or Beijing’s “One China Principle.”51 Yet
Beijing insists that Taiwan’s DPP government must recognize the
“1992 Consensus” before any further cooperation can be discussed
and even before some of the important cross-strait agreements can
continue to be implemented.52
49

Holmes Welch, The Chinese Art of Make-Believe, ENCOUNTER 8 (May 1968).
E.g., William Kazer, Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen Skirts ‘One China’ Consensus in
Inaugural Address, WALL ST. J. (May 20, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwansnew-president-skirts-one-china-consensus-in-inaugural-address-1463723943
[https://perma.cc/9DG7-K9WH];
Beijing ‘Unshakeable’ on ‘One China’ Principle as Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen Refuses to Bow
to Pressure, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 6, 2016),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2025722/beijing-unshakeableone-china-principle-taiwan [https://perma.cc/VPH6-F5CL]; Wangshu Luo, One-China
Principle Reiterated After Speech, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 27, 2017),
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-10/27/content_33759481.htm
[https://perma.cc/Z3MR-8AEC].
51 Id.
52 Guotaiban: Ru Fouding Jiu Er Gongshi Zhengzhi Jichu Shibi Daozhi Liang’an
Guanxi Xianzhuang Gaibian (國台辦：如否定「九二共識」政治基礎勢必導致兩岸關
係現狀改變) [Taiwan Affairs Office: The Denial of the Political Foundation of the “1992
50
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DPP acquiescence to this demand would be tantamount to its
implicit concession, as a matter of policy, that Taiwan is part of
“China”. This would presumably foreclose, at least for the
foreseeable future, the option of the island’s formal independence,
even though many countries have yet to accede to Beijing’s position
on the territorial status of Taiwan.53

II. CROSS-STRAIT AGREEMENTS
A.

An impressive accomplishment gone sour?

After SEF and ARATS chairmen Koo Chen-fu and Wang
Daohan signed the first four SEF-ARATS agreements on April 29,
1993,54 the two organizations continued routine talks until cross-strait
relations deteriorated in 1995, when the United States Government
granted Taiwan’s then president, Lee Teng-hui, permission to enter
the U.S. to visit his alma mater, Cornell University. There he gave a
famous speech about Taiwan’s democratization.55 Beijing responded
with personal attacks on Lee and a threatening series of missile tests
in the waters surrounding Taiwan in 1995-96.56 In October 1998,
when cross-strait agitation had relented, Koo Chen-fu visited Wang
Daohan in Shanghai, with the hope of resuming the interrupted SEFARATS talks. 57 But cross-strait tension returned in 1999 when
President Lee Teng-hui characterized Taiwan-China relations as a
“special state-to-state relationship,” which implied that Taiwan
enjoyed independent international status. 58 This eliminated the
Consensus” Must Lead to the Change of the Status Quo in Cross-strait Relations], XINHUA
WANG (新華網) [Xinhua Net] (Apr. 27, 2016) [hereinafter Guotaiban],
www.xinhuanet.com/2016-04/27/c_1118752398.htm [https://perma.cc/59Z7-2ESL].
53 See supra note 41.
54 Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, supra note 40.
55 President Lee Tenghui Cornell Commencement Address, EAST ASIAN PEACE & SEC.
INITIATIVE (1995),
https://www.eapasi.com/uploads/5/5/8/6/55860615/appendix_80_-_president_lee_tenghui_cornell_commencement_address.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R4PE-6BU4].
56 Bruce Jacobs & I-hao Ben Liu, Lee Teng-Hui and the Idea of “Taiwan”, 190 CHINA
Q. 375, 385 (2007).
57 Remarks Made by SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu Upon Arrival at Shanghai Hongqiao
Airport, MAINLAND AFF. COUNCIL OF THE EXECUTIVE YUAN ROC (TAIWAN) (Oct. 14, 1998),
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=45276FBF58204DDE&sms=232A20F
F37090599&s=39FB754FF34BE816[ https://perma.cc/W6ZS-DHDG].
58 Jacobs & Liu, supra note 56, at 388-89.
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possibility of cooperative cross-strait talks in the absence of more
positive developments.
From 2000 to 2008, the first DPP president of Taiwan, Chen
Shui-bian, refused to recognize any familiar formulation relating to
“One China,” including the KMT’s OCRI and Beijing’s One China
Principle. Although Chen would not concede that there was ever a
“1992 Consensus,” he did acknowledge a “1992 Spirit,” which he
termed a spirit of “dialogue, exchanges and shelving disputes.”59 Yet
the gap between Chen’s position and Beijing’s remained, and no
cross-strait negotiation was initiated during this period.60
When Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, he embraced the
KMT version of the “1992 Consensus”—i.e., the KMT’s OCRI
formula.61 Beijing, while still holding onto its One China Principle,
was willing to cooperate with Ma. As Beijing hoped that Taiwan’s
increasing economic integration would lead to political integration,62
Ma adopted the policy of “addressing economic matters before
political ones.”63 The shared priority on economics placed by the two
sides led to a renewed series of SEF-ARATS negotiations, which
produced many significant agreements. Their efforts culminated in
an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in June
2010 and a Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) in June
2013.64 China’s Xi Jinping, after taking over Mainland leadership
from Hu Jintao in late 2012, wished to begin political discussions

59 Luweihui: You Jiu Er Jingsheng Wu Jiu Er Gongshi (陸委會：有九二精神 無九二
共 識 ) [Mainland Affairs Council: There is “1992 Spirit” and No “1992 Consensus”],
ZHIYOU SHIBAO (自由時報) [Liberty Times] (Nov. 1, 2001),
old.ltn.com.tw/2001/new/nov/1/today-t2.htm [https://perma.cc/K48Q-DBPA].
60 Chen’s Speech a Grave Provocation to Peace, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 13, 2004),
www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-10/13/content_381992.htm
[https://perma.cc/5BFG-734S]; Jane Rickards, SEF Seeks Talks for Second Time with China
Over Official’s Visit, CHINA POST (Nov. 18, 2005),
https://chinapost.nownews.com/20051118-148799 [https://perma.cc/DU49-6MAW].
61 President Ma’s Inaugural Address, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(TAIWAN) (May 20, 2008),
https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/45 [https://perma.cc/8GNV-E3CR].
62 Dennis V. Hickey, Beijing’s Evolving Policy toward Taipei: Engagement or
Entrapment, 45 ISSUES & STUD. 31, 38-39 (2009).
63 President Ma’s Inaugural Address, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(TAIWAN) (May 20, 2012),
https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/3887 [https://perma.cc/H5G4-CJ4D].
64 See sources cited supra note 2.
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with Taiwan soon,65 but the Ma government made it clear that in its
view the time was not yet ripe for political talks.66
Ma Ying-jeou was well aware of the potential opposition in
Taiwan to closer ties with Beijing, even within his own political party,
the KMT. Thus, although KMT legislators constituted a majority in
the Legislative Yuan throughout Ma’s presidency, he sought to
minimize the opportunity for legislative review of the new cross-strait
agreements, despite the DPP’s objection. The Ma administration
insisted that, for most cross-strait agreements, no substantive
legislative review was required by Taiwan’s 1992 Law Governing
Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland
Area (the Law Governing Cross-strait Relations).67 Under that law,
a cross-strait agreement must be sent to Taiwan’s legislature for a
substantive review in circumstances where “the content of the
agreement requires any amendment to laws or creation of any new
legislation.” 68 In cases where no legislative amendment or new
legislation is required, the agreement need only be filed with the
Legislative Yuan for the record.69 Regardless of the controversies
created by its position, the Ma government successfully filed 19
agreements (out of 23 agreements concluded during Ma’s presidency)
with the Legislative Yuan merely “for the record,” instead of going
through a substantive legislative review that might have held up
approval.70
65 Ben Blanchard, China’s Xi Says Political Solution for Taiwan Can’t Wait Forever,
REUTERS (Oct. 6, 2013, 5:32 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/06/us-asia-apecchina-taiwan-idUSBRE99503Q20131006 [https://perma.cc/SV5Q-ZB22].
66 Shih Hsiu-chuan, Ma Says Time not Right for Cross-strait Peace Pact, TAIPEI TIMES
(Nov. 10, 2012),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/11/10/2003547334
[https://perma.cc/9AEE-T3PQ].
67 Taiwan Diqü yu Dalu Diqü Renmen Guanxi Tiaoli (臺灣地區與大陸地區人民關
係條例) [The Law Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the
Mainland Area] (promulgated by the Legislative Yuan, July 31, 1992, effective Sept. 18,
1992, last amended June 17, 2015).
68 Id. art. 5, ¶ 2.
69 Id.
70 The four exceptions were the ECFA, the Cross-Strait Agreement on Intellectual
Property Rights Protection and Cooperation, the CSSTA and the Cross-Strait Agreement on
Avoidance of Double Taxation and Enhancement of Tax Cooperation. The first two of these
agreements passed substantive review in August 2010. The third and the fourth, however,
were not able to pass substantive review before the end of Ma’s administration due to the
political sentiment adverse to cross-strait cooperation after the Sunflower Movement, and
therefore have never been approved and have not yet gone into effect.
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Although generally underappreciated, it was an impressive
achievement for Taipei and Beijing to conclude and implement such
a large number of important cross-strait agreements on an equal
footing by establishing the supposedly “unofficial” agencies SEF and
ARATS. This was done despite the fact that Beijing has always
maintained that Taiwan is merely a province of the PRC, and that the
Mainland’s Central Government would never deal with Taiwan on an
equal footing.
To avoid the implications of the failure to agree on the
sensitive political issues involving sovereignty, the cross-strait
agreements cleverly steered away from wording such as “China”,
“Taiwan”, “government” and other phrases that may be associated
with international relations and international law such as
“extradition”.71 Instead, innocuous terms such as “parties” and “both
sides of the Strait” (haixia liang’an 海峽兩岸) were used. When
alluding to officials in charge of implementation, they used
“personnel from the relevant responsible authorities”.
The
imaginative accomplishment is a further demonstration of their
willingness to resort to “the Chinese art of make-believe”72 in order
to meet the practical needs of cooperation. And, of course, even
while both sides continue to declare that their relationship is not
“international,” to the rest of the world the agreements that this fiction
has enabled look suspiciously similar to agreements between
sovereign governments.
B.

Resolving relevant disputes under cross-strait agreements

How should cross-strait agreements be regarded by the
international legal order? Is international law relevant—either
directly or by analogy—to the resolution of disputes that arise under
cross-strait agreements? We do not purport to discuss the perennial
and hugely important international questions concerning Taiwan’s
diplomatic and territorial status that the parties decided to avoid in

71

For example, in the Cross-Strait Agreement on Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial
Mutual Assistance, the procedure of returning criminals requested by the other side is
formally termed “repatriation” (qiansong 遣送), rather than “extradition” (yindu 引渡),
despite the fact that it is in many ways similar to the practice of extradition in conventional
bilateral relations.
72 Welch, supra note 49.
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achieving their supposed “Consensus.” 73 We are only concerned
with the immediate, practical question of whether international law
might offer Taipei relief from Beijing’s refusal to carry out its
obligations under some of the agreements.
Neither the cross-strait agreements themselves nor the
domestic laws and institutions of the parties hold significant promise
for a party that feels itself the victim of the other party’s violations.
The minimal dispute resolution provisions in the cross-strait
agreements—which generally amount to little more than admonitions
that both parties should negotiate to resolve as soon as possible any
disputes arising from the application of the agreement—are of no
value if one of the parties simply boycotts negotiations, which in itself
is another violation of the agreement.
Although Taiwan law carefully authorizes SEF to make
agreements with ARATS, it fails to provide effective remedies for
violations of the agreements. In Taiwan’s legal system, “cross-strait
agreements” appears to be a sui generis legal category, distinct from
both conventional domestic agreements and international agreements.
Nor does the PRC legal system offer opportunities for Taiwan to
obtain relief from even blatant violations of cross-strait agreements.
The problem can be illustrated by reference to the example of
the 2009 Cross-Strait Agreement on Joint Crime-Fighting and
Judicial Mutual Assistance (Judicial Assistance Agreement or
JAA),74 which operated relatively smoothly during the years of the
Ma administration. Once it became clear that the Tsai administration
would not endorse the “1992 Consensus”, Beijing ceased significant
cooperation under the agreement, and has failed to respond to efforts
to improve the situation, including resort to the agreement’s modest
dispute resolution provision.75
Can international law and institutions be helpful to the party
that deems itself to have been wronged under this agreement? The
JAA appears to have been properly concluded in accordance with
73 Many able scholars have closely examined the issue relating to the international
status of the ROC and Taiwan. E.g., Hungdah Chiu, The International Legal Status of the
Republic of China, 5 OCCASIONAL PAPERS / REPRINT SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STU. 1
(1992); CHIANG, supra note 41.
74 See discussions infra Section III C.
75 Cross-Strait Agreement on Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance,
Taiwan-China art. 22, May 22, 2009, MAINLAND AFF. COUNCIL OF THE EXECUTIVE YUAN
ROC (TAIWAN) [hereinafter JAA] (stating that “any disputes arising from the application of
this Agreement shall be resolved by prompt negotiation between the Parties.”).
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international contractual principles. Like many other cross-strait
agreements, it provides that both sides should comply with the
agreement and that any changes to the agreement, including its
termination provisions, require the negotiation and consent of both
parties.76 Evidently, there existed an intention from both parties to
create binding obligations. Even though the territorial status of
Taiwan remains an unsettled question and the ROC government only
maintains diplomatic relations with a minority of states, the ROC
conducts de facto relations, including the conclusion of international
agreements, with virtually all important states and is fully capable of
entering into such agreements either directly or via an authorized
entity such as SEF. There is no doubt that SEF was properly
authorized to enter into the JAA, as was ARATS, and there was
evidently a meeting of the minds resulting in what should be regarded
by any domestic or international legal system as a binding set of
commitments.
In the international legal order, such cross-strait agreements
should be treated as legally binding—regardless of what they are
called in each party’s domestic law. The principle pacta sunt
servanda should be applied. The parties should not be allowed to
unilaterally revise or withdraw from the agreements in the absence of
valid justification or compliance with termination or amendment
procedures.77
International legal principles can be helpful in assessing the
merit of controversies arising under the cross-strait agreements. But
where can a wronged party find a forum to plead its case if the other
party refuses to apply the relevant principles and take part in a dispute
resolution negotiation? SEF itself surely has no access to the
International Court of Justice, and the ROC, having lost its
representation in the United Nations, is very unlikely to do better. In
any event the PRC, which shuns third party adjudication, arbitration

76

Id. art. 21.
While the PRC acceded to the VCLT in 1997, the ROC failed to ratify the
Convention, which it signed in 1970, before being ousted from the UN in 1971. Since the
ROC is not a party, the VCLT cannot apply to cross-strait agreements, but this should not
affect their legal force under international law. See Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties art. 3(a)., May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
77
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or even mediation in disputes that it perceives involve sovereignty,78
would never consent to such dispute resolution.
Nevertheless, we believe that SEF should propose that
ARATS accept ad hoc arbitration by an independent tribunal, if only
to embarrass Beijing and enhance respect for Taipei in the court of
world opinion. In all likelihood world opinion will be its only
available forum, as so often occurs in international disputes.
The ROC should therefore make public not only its arbitration
proposal, but also its arguments on the merits of the JAA dispute, in
conventional international law language that should be introduced as
either directly applicable to the dispute or applicable by analogy.
This might at least stimulate Beijing, which is still subject to
widespread criticism over its refusal to recognize the major
arbitration award rendered against it concerning the South China Sea,
in a proceeding brought by the Philippines under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, to try to mount a legal defense of
its cessation of implementation under the agreement. Presumably,
Beijing might claim that President Tsai’s refusal to adopt the “1992
Consensus” had undermined the tacit, never consensually articulated,
basis of the agreement 79 and thereby released ARATS from any
obligations under it, an argument more likely to appeal to political
scientists than lawyers.
If the two parties ever resume negotiations regarding the
agreement, Taipei should, of course, raise its concerns about
Beijing’s non-compliance and seek to include in any future
agreement, and in amendments to the existing one, robust
mechanisms to resolve relevant disputes, including the possibility of
submitting the dispute to an impartial tribunal.

III. BROADER POLITICAL APPROACHES AND PROSPECTS
A.

Tsai Ing-wen’s approach

In Tsai Ing-wen’s inaugural address, she stated that crossstrait relations will be promoted based on four “political foundations”:
(1) the “historical fact” of the key 1992 SEF-ARATS meeting and the
78 Jerome A. Cohen, Law and Power in China’s International Relations, DI LIU JIE MA
HANBAO JIANGZUO LUNWEN HUIBIAN (第六屆馬漢寶講座論文彙編) [SIXTH HERBERT
HAN-PAO MA DISTINGUISHED LECTURESHIP] 275, 283-295 (2017).
79 Guotaiban, supra note 52.
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shared understanding of seeking common ground while shelving
differences, (2) the ROC’s current Constitutional regime, (3) the
achievements resulting from the negotiations and interaction of the
two sides of the Strait over more than two decades, and (4) Taiwan’s
democratic principles and popular will. 80 Her China policy is
considered moderate by the United States and other Western
governments.81
Tsai’s inaugural address suggested that she was prepared to
cooperate under the existing cross-strait agreements. Indeed, while
the DPP generally voiced objection to cross-strait agreements and the
lack of adequate legislative supervision when the KMT was in office
from 2008-2016,82 Tsai’s administration has consistently stated that
Taiwan is willing to continue to cooperate with Mainland China
regarding the implementation of the agreements and properly address
any problems.83
On the other hand, Tsai’s administration also emphasizes that
cross-strait agreements must be scrutinized more vigorously by
Taiwan’s democratic institutions. Since the Sunflower Movement,
the DPP has maintained that new legislation—namely a Cross-Strait
Agreement Supervisory Act—is needed to effectively monitor the
negotiation, signing and implementation of Taiwan’s agreements
with China. 84 Currently, there are six different versions of this
proposed legislation on the agenda of Taiwan’s legislature.85 Each
version has a different level of scrutiny for the agreements, and, more
controversially, is different in terms of how to define the nature of
cross-strait relations. One bill, for example, explicitly describes
80

President Tsai Ing-wen, supra note 18.
Paal, supra note 6.
82 Flora Wang & Vincent Y. Chao, DPP Walks Out of ECFA Review, TAIPEI TIMES
(July 10, 2010), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/07/10/2003477587
[https://perma.cc/R98E-77N9].
83 Taiwan’s President Tsai Urges Mainland China to Work with Her to Break Deadlock,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 9, 2017),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2106081/taiwans-presidenttsai-urges-china-work-her-break [https://perma.cc/MW2B-PKV6].
84 Joy Lee, DPP Tells US It Doesn’t Fully Oppose Pact, CHINA POST (Apr. 6, 2014),
https://chinapost.nownews.com/20140406-73408 [https://perma.cc/F7LZ-7P27].
85 All drafts are available on the website of the ROC Mainland Affairs Council.
Liang’an Xieyi Jiandu Tiaoli ( 兩 岸 協 議 監 督 條 例 ) [Supervisory Act on Cross-strait
Agreements], MAINLAND AFF. COUNCIL OF THE EXECUTIVE YUAN ROC (TAIWAN)
https://www.mac.gov.tw/CSASR/News.aspx?n=31D80F602BE78F77&sms=77196D4469
ABAD63 [https://perma.cc/G9YR-NFH6].
81
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China-Taiwan relations as interstate relations, instead of “cross-strait
relations,” as they are normally termed in Taiwan’s legislation.86
Obviously, trying to pass a law that can spark many
controversies, including those relating to Taiwan’s sovereignty, is not
what Tsai Ing-wen needs at this point, when her popularity has
declined due to other domestic reform issues.87 The DPP caucus also
appears to be dragging its feet on the proposed “supervisory”
legislation. 88 Yet, without this legislation, Tsai’s government is
unlikely to sign any new agreement with Beijing even if the two sides
resume talks, and there is no indication that any talks will be resumed
soon.
B.

Xi Jinping’s approach

After Tsai made her conciliatory tone clear in her inaugural
address, China could have seized this opportunity to initiate
communication with the DPP government. Instead, the PRC’s
Taiwan Affairs Office, noting that Tsai did not clearly recognize the
so-called “1992 Consensus,” described Tsai’s inaugural speech as an
“incomplete test answer.”89 Beijing has since cut any official contact
with the DPP administration. 90 There are no longer SEF-ARATS
meetings to negotiate new agreements or to communicate about the
implementation of the existing agreements. Beijing has selectively
86 NPP Caucus Tables Bill on Monitoring Cross-strait Pacts, TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 2,
2016),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/,/03/02/2003640630
[https://perma.cc/U2UV-NXUK].
87 Wei-han Chen, Tsai Still Low, But Lai Rebounds in Poll, TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 20,
2018),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/,/03/20/2003689652
[https://perma.cc/ZCU2-PGLV] (reporting a drop in President Tsai’s approval rating
concurrently with the implementation of pension policies and alterations to employment
laws).
88 Ke Yu’an (柯昱安), Ke Jianming: Liang’an Jiandu Tiaoli Xian Jieduan Bushi Zui
Zhongyao (柯建銘：兩岸監督條例現階段不是最重要) [Ko Chien-ming: Cross-strait
Supervisory Act Is Not the Most Important Task in the Current Stage], XIN TOU KE (新頭
殼) [Newtalk] (Mar. 22, 2017),
https://newtalk.tw/news/view/2017-03-22/83302 [https://perma.cc/U7LP-MJC9].
89 Tsai’s Speech on Cross-Straits Ties Offers “An Incomplete Test Answer:” Mainland
Official, XINHUA NET (May 20, 2016),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-05/20/c_135375684.htm
[https://perma.cc/82D3-SCV9].
90 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Beijing’s Policy towards President Tsai Ying-wen and the
Future of Cross-strait Relations, 18 WHITEHEAD J. DIPL. & INT’L REL. 55 (2017).
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continued to implement the existing cross-strait agreements as it
strives to mount increasing pressures on Tsai’s government.
From Beijing’s perspective, only the “1992 Consensus” can
serve as a “common political foundation” for any future ARATS-SEF
talks or more official dialogues, not to mention further cross-strait
agreements.91 Without the “Consensus”, adverse “changes in crossstrait relations would be inevitable.” 92 This narrative implies
Beijing’s self-justification for unilaterally limiting or ceasing the
implementation of the cross-strait agreements.
In our view, this non-cooperative approach is rigid,
unnecessary and self-restrictive. By contrast, Beijing was willing to
cooperate with the KMT government even though Beijing’s
interpretation of the “1992 Consensus” was different from that of the
KMT’s. It was flexible enough to not publicly challenge the KMT’s
position on the “1992 Consensus,” enabling the two sides to proceed
to discuss other matters. Yet Beijing would not adopt a similarly
adaptable approach with the DPP government, which it does not trust.
Beijing is suspicious that Tsai Ing-wen, while not
declaring de jure Taiwan independence, will promote “soft
independence,” “cultural independence” and other de-sinicization
policies that foster an already strong Taiwan national identity
independent of China. 93 Xi Jinping has proclaimed the “Chinese
Dream of national rejuvenation” as a priority and made the return of
Taiwan to Mainland China’s rule an indispensable part of the rise of
the Chinese nation.94 This represents a dramatic shift in the political
atmosphere from the post-2008 Ma Ying-jeou “honeymoon” period
for China-Taiwan relations. The current time is often described as an

91

Guotaiban, supra note 52.
Id.
93 Taiwan Covert Move Fails, CHINA DAILY (Sept. 13, 2017, 7:24 AM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2017-09/13/content_31926925.htm
[https://perma.cc/5M3A-K4RZ]; J. Michael Cole, Chinese Warns of ‘Soft’ and ‘Insidious’
Taiwan Independence Forces, THE NEWS LENS (July 27, 2016),
https://international.thenewslens.com/article/45216 [https://perma.cc/W83F-U7YB].
94 Xi Calls for Persistently Pursing Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation, XINHUA
NET (Sept. 25, 2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-09/25/c_136637577.html
[https://perma.cc/G69J-MWZ9]; Li Zhenguang, Taiwan Integral to National Rejuvenation,
CHINA DAILY (Oct. 20, 2017),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/newsrepublic/2017-10/20/content_33509757.htm
[https://perma.cc/U2JQ-E5JD].
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era of “cold peace.” 95 Some commentators predict an even more
problematic period of “hot confrontation.”96
Although China now rejects implementation of certain crossstrait agreements, it has not gone so far as to formally renounce any
of them. It has mostly minimized, if not ceased, the implementation
of some of them. Sometimes it deliberately ignores their existence
when doing so would be politically advantageous for pressing the
Tsai government. Yet, where the practical consequences of
suspending implementation would obviously be harmful to the major
interests of both sides of the Strait, as in the case of an interruption or
reduction of air and sea transportation, Beijing has allowed the
relevant agreements to continue largely unaffected.
In other words, Beijing is not ready to entirely discard the
agreements. It is probably also concerned that, if it repudiates any
cross-strait agreements, the “1992 Consensus”—which in Beijing’s
version means the “One China Principle”—will begin to lose its most
visible manifestations. The logic here understandably seems to be
“don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater.”
This is Beijing’s self-imposed dilemma. On the one hand, it
cannot afford to abandon the agreements. On the other hand, it does
not wish to cooperate with Tsai Ing-wen’s government unless she
agrees with China’s political position. Accordingly, we see a Beijing
that continues to tolerate effective implementation of certain crossstrait agreements still deemed to be essential, while trying to limit,
marginalize, or ignore others. The following notable examples
illustrate the situation.
C.

Examples of China’s non-compliance with cross-strait
agreements

One of Beijing’s earliest post-Ma efforts to put economic
pressure on Taiwan was its reduction of the number of Mainland

95 Paul Lin, ‘Cold Peace’ A Likely Stable Future, TAIPEI TIMES (May 28, 2016),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2016/05/28/2003647286
[https://perma.cc/3S4J-3F59].
96 Cross-Strait Crisis Management during Cold Confrontation (Translation), NAT’L
POL’Y FOUND. (China Times Editorial trans. June 6, 2016),
http://www.taiwannpfnews.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=113&anum=17
690 [https://perma.cc/Q4K5-TVF3].
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Chinese tourists allowed to visit the island.97 The 2008 Cross-Strait
Agreement on Mainland Tourists Traveling to Taiwan (the Tourism
Agreement)98 allowed Mainland Chinese tourists to go to Taiwan for
the first time. The number of Chinese visitors per year increased
rapidly from more than 300,000 in 2008 to more than four million in
2015.99
The year of Tsai’s ascendancy, 2016, began to see the first
decline, and in 2017 Taiwan hosted only around 2.7 million Chinese
tourists.100 Thus, the influx of Chinese tourists has not stopped but
has dropped quickly. Beijing has not torn up the Tourism Agreement
but has reportedly used tactics to discourage or disapprove tourists
from visiting Taiwan in order to cut the island’s tourism profits. Yet,
the initial decrease of tourists from China was offset largely due to
the increase in number of tourists to Taiwan from South East Asia,
Japan, Macao, Hong Kong and South Korea.101
Beijing has also made some cross-strait institutions suspend
their operation, even affecting one of the most important agreements,
the ECFA, a major economic agreement that cuts tariffs on more than
500 Taiwanese exports to China and more than 250 Chinese exports
to Taiwan.102 Under the ECFA, the two parties jointly established the
“Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Committee,” which according
to the agreement is in charge of monitoring and evaluating the
agreement, settling any dispute over its interpretation, and

97

Chris Horton, China’s Attempt to Punish Taiwan by Throttling Tourism Has
Seriously Backfired, QUARTZ (Feb. 10, 2017), https://qz.com/907429/chinas-attempt-topunish-taiwan-by-throttling-tourism-has-seriously-backfired
[https://perma.cc/7ZGB-N582].
98 Haixia Liang’an Guanyu Dalu Jümin Fu Taiwan Lüyou Xieyi (海峽兩岸關於大陸
居民赴臺灣旅遊協議) [Cross-Strait Agreement concerning Mainland Tourists Traveling to
Taiwan], China-Taiwan, June 13, 2008, translated on Mainland Affairs Council website,
http://ws.mac.gov.tw/001/Upload/OldFile/public/Data/011216194071.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZD74-4XB6] (last visited Nov. 13, 2018).
99 Sarah Mishkin, Chinese Tourists Boost Taiwan Economy, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 30,
2012),
https://www.ft.com/content/b231cf10-f248-11e1-8973-00144feabdc0
[https://perma.cc/KU49-3W4N].
100 Russell Hsiao, China’s Intensifying Pressure Campaign against Taiwan, 18 CHINA
BRIEF (2018), https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Read-the-6-19-2018-CBIssue-in-PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RBT-6T4K].
101 Id.
102 Historic Taiwan-China Trade Deal Takes Effect, BBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2010),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11275274 [https://perma.cc/HP3U-FRGF].
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negotiating and implementing new agreements related to ECFA.103
The Committee used to meet regularly, but it has not held any
meetings since 2015. 104 As a result, when tariff-free treatments
expire, there is no channel to make new arrangements, and the
relevant industries (especially Taiwanese industries that had
benefited from ECFA) are now adversely impacted.105
Beijing has also suspended the operation of other dispute
resolution procedures authorized by certain agreements. In January
2018, for example, despite Taiwan’s protests, China launched new
northbound air flights on the M503 route, which is only kilometers
away from the middle line of the Taiwan Strait and close to a buffer
zone designed to protect Taiwan against Chinese military
intrusions. 106 China also expanded other routes that are close to
Taiwan’s air-defense identification zone.107 Taiwan claimed these
routes to be a great danger to the island’s aviation safety.108 In fact,
this is not the first time Beijing and Taipei have had aviation disputes.
In March 2015, the two encountered similar issues over the M503
route but were able to reach a compromise in accordance with the
communication clause in the 2009 Supplementary Agreement on
Cross-Strait Air Transportation. 109 This time, however, Beijing
103 Haixia Liang’an Jingji Hezuo Jiagou Xieyi (海峽兩岸經濟合作架構協議) [The
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement], China-Taiwan, art. 11, June 29, 2010; see
also sources cited supra note 2.
104 Chou Pei-feng (仇佩芬), Liang’an Jinghehui Tingbai Yu 2 Nian ECFA Wuyiweiji
(兩岸經合會停擺逾 2 年 ECFA 無以為繼) [ECFA Committee Has Been Discontinued for
Over Two Years, Leading to Suspension of ECFA], UP MEDIA (Feb. 2, 2017, 9:50 PM),
www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?SerialNo=11582 [https://perma.cc/D9G5-KJL9].
105 Id.
106 The Skinny on the China vs Taiwan M503 Air Route Saga, THE NEWS LENS (Mar. 16,
2018),
https://international.thenewslens.com/article/91669 [https://perma.cc/W8TG-9RGY].
107 Chiu Bihui, China vs. Taiwan—Controversy Over Flight Route M503, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/china-vs-taiwan-controversy-over-flightroute-m503/a-42430594 [https://perma.cc/9V26-PPPA].
108 C.L. Chen & Flor Wang, 176 Lunar New Year Flights Put on Hold Due to M503
Dispute, FOCUS TAIWAN (Jan. 18, 2018),
http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201801180023.aspx [https://perma.cc/N6XV-FRYA].
109 See Haixia Liang’an Kongyun Buchong Xieyi ( 海 峽 兩 岸 空 運 補 充 協 議 )
[Supplementary Agreement on Cross-Strait Air Transportation], China-Taiwan, art. 12, May
22, 2009, translated on Mainland Affairs Council website,
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/cp.aspx?n=FD37619195CF6DA5&s=B8F2335E74E0748C
[https://perma.cc/DL4H-2FKE] (last visited Aug. 15, 2018) (stating that “the Parties agree
that the aviation regulators on the two sides of the Strait shall establish a liaison mechanism,
to conduct communication and exchange of views on matters related to cross-strait air
transport at any time according to need.”).
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refused to communicate with Taipei under the agreement, claiming
that its new move did not concern Taiwan.110 In response, Taipei
canceled 176 charter flights across the Strait ahead of the 2018 Lunar
New Year.111
China has also pressed hard to change the existing practice
under some of the other agreements. It has, since April 2016,
persuaded several countries that do not have official diplomatic
relations with Taiwan (including Kenya, Malaysia, Cambodia and
Armenia) to send Taiwanese nationals they have detained for
telecommunications fraud to China rather than Taiwan for
prosecution.112 This is a sharp departure from China’s practice since
2011 of collaborating with Taiwanese law enforcement under the
Judicial Assistance Agreement. During the 2011-16 period, in
accordance with the JAA, Chinese police worked jointly with
Taiwanese police in third countries, not only exchanging information
but also helping local law enforcement arrest Chinese and Taiwanese
suspected of colluding in telecom fraud schemes that prey on both
Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese. 113 In a friendly exercise of
discretion, during that period, Chinese police joined in sending
Taiwanese suspects in third countries directly to Taiwan while
returning the PRC nationals to Mainland China, thus avoiding any
political controversy.114
To be sure, China has always claimed criminal jurisdiction
over such Taiwanese suspects whenever the alleged fraud has
victimized PRC citizens. By now resuming the exercise of that
jurisdiction, Beijing can punish Taiwanese offenders more severely
than they have generally been punished if returned to Taiwan.
Moreover, the cooperation of third countries in deporting Taiwanese
to the Mainland reminds the world of Beijing’s long-standing
position that Taiwan is part of China, which is considered helpful at
110 Opening New Air Routes No Threat to Taiwan, GLOBAL TIMES (Jan. 5, 2018, 10:08
PM), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1083562.shtml [https://perma.cc/4R4Y-SPTN].
111 Chen & Wang, supra note 108.
112 Taiwan Lodges Protest as Armenia Deports Fraud Suspects to China, REUTERS (Sept.
8, 2016, 9:28 AM),
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-taiwan-china-armenia-idUKKCN11E04T
[https://perma.cc/HU39-C7Y9].
113 Yu-Jie Chen & Jerome A. Cohen, Beijing and Taipei Should End Their Tug of War
Over Repatriation of Criminal Suspects, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 28, 2016, 6:12
PM), https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2023276/beijing-and-taipeishould-end-their-tug-war-over [https://perma.cc/P53Z-YXKK].
114 Id.
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a time when Beijing is building pressure on Tsai’s government to
adopt the same position.115
An extreme example of China’s current tactics of simply
ignoring certain cross-strait agreements is the infamous prosecution
of Mr. Lee Ming-che, a Taiwanese NGO activist currently serving a
five-year sentence in China for “subverting state power” by his
peaceful criticism of the Chinese government.116 Lee disappeared in
China on March 19, 2017. Ten days later, Beijing, having ignored
the Taiwan government’s appeals for information through prescribed
channels under the Judicial Assistance Agreement, finally
admitted—without following the prescribed procedures under the
JAA—that Lee had been placed in official custody.117 Lee’s eventual
trial was webcast, so that he could be seen confessing to participating
in a “criminal organization” that allegedly incited web users to spread
articles that “vilified and defamed China’s socialist system.”118 He is
the first Taiwanese to be convicted of human rights activity in
China.119
During this high-profile case that added much tension to the
already strained cross-strait relations, Beijing showed no regard for
the JAA. Its belated acknowledgement of Lee’s detention—not in
response to SEF’s requests, but at a routine press conference—was
itself a violation of the Agreement, which obligates each party to
“promptly” notify the other side when it has restricted the liberty of
one of the other side’s people.120 Notification in this case was not
“prompt,” nor was it communicated through formal channels.
115

Id.
Jerome A. Cohen & Yu-Jie Chen, A Taiwanese Man’s Detention in Guangdong
Threatens a Key Pillar of Cross-Straits Relations, CHINA FILE (Apr. 20, 2017),
www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/taiwanese-mans-detention-guangdongthreatens-key-pillar-of-cross-straits [https://perma.cc/8632-5YYU].
117 Id.
118 Jerome A. Cohen & Yu-Jie Chen, How China’s Trial of Lee Ming-Che Is a Warning
to Taiwanese Activists Inspired By Freedoms and Democracy, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
(Oct. 2, 2017),
https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2113665/how-chinas-trial-leeming-che-warning-taiwanese-activists [https://perma.cc/5QLC-U8BW].
119 Id.
120 See Haixia Liang’an Gongtong Daji Fanzui ji Sifa Huzhu Xieyi (海峽兩岸共同打
擊犯罪及司法互助協議) [Cross-Strait Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance
Agreement], China-Taiwan, art. 12, May 22, 2009, translated on Mainland Affairs Council
website,
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/cp.aspx?n=FD37619195CF6DA5&s=CED288DC9B1EC576
[https://perma.cc/LR5B-ZVML] (last visited Aug. 15, 2018) (“The Parties agree to promptly
116
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Beijing also violated the JAA provision that requires the
facilitation of family visits to the detainee121; it revoked the entry
permit of Lee Ming-che’s wife, Ms. Lee Ching-yu, right before she
boarded a plane from Taiwan to China.122 Throughout this case, the
Chinese government did not mention a word about its obligations
under the JAA. Ms. Lee, after making numerous requests to the
Chinese government to visit Mr. Lee in prison, finally was allowed
to do so in March 2018. More recently, however, her request to see
her husband was again denied.123 Mr. Lee is now serving a five-year
sentence for his peaceful rights advocacy, a violation by China of the
freedom of speech guaranteed under international law and the PRC
Constitution.
These major incidents illustrate how Beijing seeks to exert
pressures on Tsai’s government by non-cooperation, non-compliance
measures, despite the commitments it has made under the cross-strait
agreements. Beijing has not disclaimed the agreements altogether,
but has adopted a minimalist, selective approach towards their
implementation.
D.

Beijing’s carrots and sticks

While Beijing has severed communication with Tsai Ingwen’s government, it seeks to appeal to multiple groups of Taiwanese
through attractive measures that mostly offer economic, educational
and employment benefits. The Chinese government now emphasizes
“integration and development” 124 as a main policy to promote
economic and social integration with the island. It also creates new
inform the other side of persons having their personal liberty restricted, suffering non-natural
death or suspected non-natural death, and other such major incidents, and to provide
facilitation for visits by family members in accordance with each Party’s own rules and
regulations.”).
121 Id.
122 Abraham Gerber, Beijing Blocks Advocate’s Wife, TAIPEI TIMES (Apr. 11, 2017),
www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives//04/11/2003668483
[https://perma.cc/RN6Y-64XW].
123 Wife of Jailed Taiwan Activist Denied Visits; Health Concerns Raised, FOCUS
TAIWAN (Nov. 10, 2018, 3:18 PM),
focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201811100007.aspx [https://perma.cc/3RVQ-D4T3].
124 “Wenhua Taidu” Dang Bu Zhu Liang’an Jingji Shehui Ronghe Fazhan de Dachao
(「文化台獨」擋不住兩岸經濟社會融合發展的大潮) [“Cultural Taiwan Independence”
Cannot Block the Tidal Wave of Cross-strait Economic and Social Integration and
Development], HUANQIU WANG (環球網) [Global Daily] (Oct. 13, 2017),
http://taiwan.huanqiu.com/article/2017-10/11324881.html [https://perma.cc/Q9RU-V9K8].
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mechanisms, such as a new service center in China for Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Macau businesses (run by the China Council for the
Promotion of International Trade), that enable direct interaction with
Taiwan business and civic groups, thereby marginalizing the role of
the DPP government.125
In fact, after the 2014 Sunflower Movement that frustrated
Taiwan’s formal legislative approval of the CSSTA, Beijing learned
that it needed to change its policy to one that would cultivate and lure
groups of Taiwanese that it had previously overlooked, especially
those that were deemed to disapprove of economic ties with China.
Beijing referred to these groups as Sanzhongyiqing ( 三 中 一 青 ),
meaning small and medium businesses, people with middle or low
income, people in Central and Southern Taiwan and young
generations. 126 The idea is to offer economic benefits to these
targeted populations so there will be a broader support base in Taiwan
for unification with China. This Sanzhongyiqing policy has now been
more politely rephrased as Yidaiyixian ( 一 代 一 線 ) to broadly
include young generations and grassroots communities.
Most recently, China released a package of “31 measures”
that are said to give Taiwanese companies and residents “equal
status” to Mainland Chinese counterparts, showering them with
business, social and employment opportunities in China.127 These
include, for example, allowing Taiwanese companies doing business
on the Mainland to bid for China’s infrastructure projects and to claim
tax benefits and permitting Taiwanese professionals to take exams for
a range of 134 professional qualifications.128 Taiwanese students in
125 Chou Pei-feng (仇佩芬), Liang’an “Xinmoshi” Mei “Jiu’er Guanjianzi” Zhongfang
Pinkai Minjian Duihua Shichuang (兩岸「新模式」沒「九二關鍵字」 中方頻開民間對
話視窗) [Cross-Strait “New Model” Without the “1992 Keyword”—the Chinese Side Seeks
to Open Windows of Civil Society Dialogue], UP MEDIA (Feb. 3, 2017),
https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?SerialNo=11595
[https://perma.cc/VWH3-QLLR].
126 Dalu dui Tai Xin Zhengci Yidai Yixian Qüdai Sanzhong Yiqing (大陸對台新政策 一
代 一 線 取 代 三 中 一 青 ) [The Mainland’s New Policy toward Taiwan: “Yidaiyixian”
Replaces “Sanzhongyiqing”], ZHONGGUO SHIBAO (中國時報) [China Times] (May 24,
2017),
https://www.chinatimes.com/cn/newspapers/20170524000115-260203
[https://perma.cc/JZ5C-7UXP].
127 Kristin Huang, Taiwanese Given ‘Equal Status’ on China’s Mainland, But Is Beijing
Just Trying to Buy Their Support?, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 11, 2018, 11:25 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2135291/taiwanese-givenequal-status-chinas-mainland-beijing [https://perma.cc/55QV-UFF9].
128 Id.
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China are also encouraged to find jobs in China after graduation,
including, for instance, internships at state-owned banks.129
The Taiwan government criticizes China’s policy as using
money to buy political influence, and says it will heighten the
awareness of the island’s youth about the risks of living under
China’s undemocratic rule.130 It has also underlined the difference
between China and Taiwan in values, emphasizing that only with a
China that fulfills universal values of democracy, the rule of law and
human rights can peaceful cross-strait relations be achieved.131
China has always adopted a “mercantilist” approach towards
Taiwan, especially during the Ma era when the two sides made deals
that were plainly designed to “offer economic benefits to Taiwan”
(Rangli 讓利). Beijing is now intensifying this approach and trying
to reach broader groups while circumventing official Taipei channels.
In addition to these economic “carrots,” Beijing also resorts
to military “sticks” to reinforce the message about its power in
relation to Taiwan. The newly-reconstituted Chinese aircraft carrier,
Liaoning, has sailed through the Taiwan Strait a number of times in
recent months.132 While Beijing claims these passages are routine
drills and the carrier has stayed on the west side of the median line of
the Taiwan Strait,133 it is obvious that Beijing’s move is an intentional
129 Lin Jing-jie (林勁傑)，Zhongguo Yinhang Hui Tai Shou Zhao Zai Lu Taisheng (中
國 銀 行 惠 台 首 招 在 陸 台 生 ) [Chinese Banks Offer Benefits for Taiwan, Recruiting
Taiwanese Students in the Mainland for the First Time], ZHONGGUO SHIBAO (中國時報)
[China Times] (Mar. 31, 2018, 4:10 AM),
http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20180331000500-260108
[https://perma.cc/2NSN-9KAQ].
130 Taiwan Says Should Educate Its Youth on Dangers of China, REUTERS (Mar. 23,
2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-china/taiwan-says-should-educate-itsyouth-on-dangers-of-china-idUSKBN1GZ1AN [https://perma.cc/BW4S-9HZF].
131 Chai Sze-chia & Evelyn Kao, MAC Calls on China to Improve Human Rights
Protection, FOCUS TAIWAN (July 12, 2018),
http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201807120019.aspx [https://perma.cc/RC5W-CFG4].
132 Taiwan Shadows China Carrier Group After Xi Warning, CHANNEL NEWS ASIA (Mar.
21, 2018, 12:15 PM),
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/china-sends-carrier-through-taiwan-straitafter-xi-warning-10062490 [https://perma.cc/9W3C-HCVD].
133 Ben Blanchard, China Says South China Sea Drills Routine, No Word on Carrier,
REUTERS (Mar. 29, 2018, 6:30 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-southchinasea/china-says-south-china-sea-drillsroutine-no-word-on-carrier-idUSKBN1H51BT [https://perma.cc/FV8G-N64L]; Matthew
Strong, Chinese Aircraft Carrier Liaoning Passes through Taiwan Strait, TAIWAN NEWS
(Jan. 5, 2018, 7:58 PM),
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3334978 [https://perma.cc/8ATU-URRF].
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effort to intimidate the island’s population. Alarmed by this new
tactic, Taipei dispatched fighter jets and ships to monitor these
crossings carefully.134 In March 2018, days after President Donald
Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act, which encourages high-level
official visits between Taiwan and the U.S., the Liaoning cruised
through the Taiwan Strait again.135
Another recent move that heightens Taipei’s unease is
Beijing’s new northbound flights on the route M503, as noted earlier.
Taiwan claims that China’s new flights are intended as military and
political provocations of the island.136 This will require the Taiwan
government to incur greater military costs to enhance its monitoring
of the flights. There are recently even more provocative actions by
Beijing to increase military tensions and opportunities for
confrontations. The most dangerous have been China’s “live-fire”
naval exercises near the island, which immediately elicited Taipei’s
own ”live-fire” exercises in response.137
E.

Beijing’s recent international tactics

At least as early as 2003, Beijing began to designate its longstanding demand for the return of Taiwan to the Motherland as one
of its “core interests,” 138 signifying an uncompromising, “nonnegotiable” stance.139 During Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency from 2008

134 Eva Dou, Taiwan Military Tails Chinese Aircraft Carrier, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 21,
2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwan-military-tails-chinese-aircraft-carrier-1521625526
[https://perma.cc/T2D9-56JD].
135 Id.
136 ROC Protests Unilateral Launch of Mainland China Flight Routes in Taiwan Strait,
Urges Consultation, ROC MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=8157691CA2AA32F8&sms=4F8ED5
441E33EA7B&s=F66994C5329CCB5A [https://perma.cc/F95F-4N8H].
137 Minnie Chan & Liu Zhen, Beijing ‘Takes Aim at Taipei’ with ‘Last-minute’ Live-fire
Drills in the Taiwan Strait, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 13, 2018),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2141690/beijing-takes-aimtaipei-last-minute-live-fire-drills [https://perma.cc/ZU96-76JZ].
138 Michael D. Swaine, China’s Assertive Behavior Part One: On “Core Interests”, 34
CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 3 (Feb. 22, 2011),
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/CLM34MS.pdf
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139 Id. at 8.
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to 2016, Beijing relaxed some measures that had been used to block
Taiwan’s international participation.140
Since Tsai Ing-wen’s presidential election, Beijing has
resumed a tougher position.141 Its diplomatic tactics have recently
included establishing diplomatic ties with Gambia, luring São Tomé
and Príncipe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso and El
Salvador to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China,142
and excluding Taiwan from meetings of the World Health
Assembly, 143 the International Civil Aviation Organization, 144 and
the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). 145
Beijing’s tactics include some that are as pathetic as preventing
ordinary Taiwanese from even visiting the UN as tourists, unless they
show a Mainland Travel Permit for Taiwan Residents issued by the
PRC government, which implies Chinese nationality.146
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available at https://wcts.sinica.edu.tw/05_03_en.php [https://perma.cc/WP3F-ZWCK].
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(July 8, 2018), http://www.atimes.com/taiwan-resilient-in-face-of-beijings-coercive-tactics
[https://perma.cc/J4FJ-XDA2]; Chris Horton, El Salvador Recognizes China in Blow to
Taiwan, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/world/asia/taiwan-el-salvador-diplomatic-ties.html
[https://perma.cc/KA3S-24FA].
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(Mar. 21, 2018),
http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201803210020.aspx. [https://perma.cc/8VBY-TFDF].
144 Lin Feng, Taiwan Snubbed by ICAO, Under Pressure from China, VOICE OF AM.
(Sept. 23, 2016, 6:07 PM),
https://www.voanews.com/a/taiwan-snubbed-icao-pressure-china/3522841.html
[https://perma.cc/4CRK-UX9S].
145 Taiwan Barred from Interpol Assembly, TAIPEI TIMES (Nov. 6, 2016),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/11/06/2003658663
[https://perma.cc/6VYE-KSH7].
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These past few years have also seen Beijing escalating tactics
to put pressures on various international businesses to agree to
China’s position that Taiwan is part of China. Beijing has pushed the
U.S. hotel chain Marriott to apologize for listing Taiwan as a country
on its website.147 Under China’s pressures, major German companies
such as Lufthansa, Mercedes-Benz and Bosch have also listed
Taiwan as part of China on their websites.148 In May 2018, Beijing
issued an order to dozens of foreign air carriers, demanding that they
stop referring to Taiwan as an independent nation on their “websites
or in other material” and that they rename it as “Taiwan, China” or
“Chinese Taipei.”149 Airlines that fail to comply will suffer sanctions
and be deemed “untrustworthy” in “China’s social credit system”,
which will undoubtedly have an adverse impact on their business.150
All airlines on the list have followed China’s instructions, including
the U.S. airlines.151 The White House has criticized China’s order as
“Orwellian nonsense”.152 A U.K. foreign affairs official remarked
that, “U.K. companies should not be placed under political pressure
to make changes on its designation of Taiwan.”153
China’s increasingly assertive behavior on the international
stage—not just on the question of Taiwan but more generally on other
147
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controversial issues, such as the PRC’s military land reclamation
efforts in the South China Sea and its “united front” attempts to
influence developments in various democracies, including the EU,
Australia and New Zealand—has heightened the concerns of many
countries.154
The U.S. is particularly alarmed. Facing a China that is
widely perceived to be ever more aggressive, as previously
mentioned, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Travel Act in March
2018.155 On a voice vote, the Act won the unanimous support of both
Republicans and Democrats in the Senate as well as the House of
Representatives, which is unusual in America’s current polarized
political climate. The Act, which President Trump gladly signed,
encourages “officials at all levels of the U.S. Government, including
Cabinet-level national security officials, general officers, and other
executive branch officials,” to travel to Taiwan and high-level
officials of Taiwan to enter the U.S.156 While the Act is generally
considered symbolic, it is still a remarkable achievement for
Taiwan’s diplomatic efforts.
Beijing, of course, was vexed by this development, since until
recently it had generally succeeded in preventing high level official
contacts between Washington and Taipei. When the U.S. Congress
was debating the draft Taiwan Travel Act, China’s official media
issued a warning, threatening serious retaliatory action if the Act
was adopted.157 Days after passage of the Act, Xi Jinping responded
with a harsh statement that “[a]ny actions and tricks to split China are
doomed to failure and will meet with the people’s condemnation and
154 Thorsten Benner et al., Authoritarian Advance: Responding to China’s Growing
Political Influence in Europe, GLOBAL PUB. POL’Y INST. (Feb. 2018),
www.gppi.net/fileadmin/user_upload/media/pub/2018/Benner_MERICS_2018_Authoritari
an_Advance.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2LF-U2HF]; Joshua Kurlantzick, Australia, New
Zealand Face China’s Influence, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Dec. 13, 2017),
https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/australia-new-zealand-face-chinas-influence
[https://perma.cc/U4XX-N6LR].
155 Taiwan Travel Act, H.R. 535, Pub.L. 115–135,
https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr535/BILLS-115hr535enr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5KW4-XEPQ].
156 Id. § 3.
157 Sheping: Meizhongyuan “Taiwan Lüxing Fa” shi “Cuihui Taiwan Fa” (社評：美
眾院「台灣旅行法」是「摧毀台灣法」) [Editorial: the “Taiwan Travel Act” of the U.S.
House of Representatives is the “Act to Destroy Taiwan”], HUANQIU SHIBAO (環球時報)
[Global Daily] (Jan. 10, 2018),
http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2018-01/11512000.html
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punishment of history.”158 Following the Act’s promulgation, U.S.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Alex Wong, traveled to Taiwan.
Wong remarked during the visit that “Taiwan can no longer be
excluded unjustly from international fora.”159 Since President Trump
later shed doubt upon the wisdom of Wong’s visit,160 however, the
extent to which Washington intends to implement the Act is unclear.
In this uncertain but largely negative political climate, in the
eyes of many in the world community Xi Jinping’s hope to achieve
the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation by reunifying Taiwan
with Mainland China is likely to be seen as unduly nationalist and
expansionist. How much harder Beijing may push and how much of
a backlash that might inspire, remains to be seen.
IV. CONCLUSION
In principle, China views the reunification of Taiwan with the
Mainland as the most important issue on its agenda. Yet, Taiwan’s
continuous growth as one of Asia’s most robust liberal democracies
as well as its developing Taiwanese national identity are enlarging
the political and psychological gaps between Taiwan and China. As
the former tension across the strait is renewing, this Article seeks to
contribute to relevant scholarship and policy discussion by offering a
critical evaluation of the most contentious aspects of current ChinaTaiwan relations—the controversial “1992 Consensus” and the
remarkable cross-strait agreements that Taipei and Beijing have
concluded.
We note that the “1992 Consensus” would not be deemed to
be legally binding under international law; nor was it even a genuine
158
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consensus. The term has been employed by the KMT and CCP as a
placeholder phrase to refer to their differing positions about China.
The KMT has used the “1992 Consensus” to refer to the formula of
OCRI while the CCP has used it to refer to Beijing’s “One China
Principle.” That is, the two sides differ on not only what “One China”
means but also what the “1992 Consensus” means. The term must be
understood simply as a formula strategically constructed after the fact
to allow the KMT and the CCP governments to shelve their differing
positions concerning which government is the legitimate, exclusive
representative of “China” and to proceed to cooperation. It is not
analogous to an international agreement and should not be considered
to have binding legal effect on Taipei or Beijing.
With regard to cross-strait agreements, by contrast, while
neither Beijing nor Taipei considers them to be “international
agreements” per se, they would be deemed to be legally binding in
the eyes of the international legal order, and therefore both China and
Taipei should be obliged to comply with them in good faith.
However, their dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms are
understandably weak and not capable of dealing with the
unanticipated issue of whether President Tsai’s refusal to endorse the
“1992 Consensus” entitles Beijing to cease or diminish
implementation of any of the agreements.
In these circumstances, we believe that the ROC should try
once again to negotiate with the PRC through their proxies in
accordance with the dispute resolution provisions of each of the
agreements that has gone into effect. If this renewed effort proves
fruitless, the ROC should seek to obtain PRC consent to third party
conciliation or mediation and, if need be, an ad hoc arbitration.
Although, at present, the chances are nil that the PRC might accept
any formal third-party role in settling this dispute, the ROC’s effort
to invoke international third-party participation as well as relevant
international norms for evaluating the merits of the dispute should
boost foreign respect for the ROC for prompting the PRC to comply
with the norms and institutions of the rule-based world order.
Publicly emphasizing the PRC’s non-compliance with the
agreements may not only embarrass Beijing and elevate Taipei’s
status in the court of world opinion, but also stimulate Beijing’s
willingness to resume negotiations. If the two parties decide to
resume negotiations, Taipei, in raising its concerns about Beijing’s
non-compliance, should seek to include in future agreements, as well
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as in the amendment of existing ones, more robust procedures for
resolving disputes, including the possibility of submitting any legal
issues to an independent tribunal.
This Article highlights Beijing’s self-imposed dilemma. In
Beijing’s view, these cross-strait agreements are difficult to abandon
and yet equally difficult to fully implement as long as the DPP
administration does not recognize the “1992 Consensus.”
Accordingly, Beijing has thus far adopted a highly selective,
politically expedient approach toward the continuing fulfillment of
its legal commitments, while making other moves —’carrots and
sticks’—that bypass and increase pressures upon the DPP
government. It is ironic that Beijing insists on Taipei’s literal
acceptance of the “1992 Consensus”, as though it were a legally
binding agreement. Yet, it shows little regard for cross-strait
agreements that should plainly be deemed legally binding! As the
Chinese slogan puts it, “Politics takes command.”
In our view, political actors on both sides of the Taiwan Strait
have generally undervalued the potential of a rule-based order to
facilitate institutional cooperation and sustainable peace in crossstrait relations. The CCP is willing to thumb its nose at cross-strait
agreements for short-term political gains. The KMT, zealous to make
progress in cross-strait relations, tried to ram cross-strait agreements
through the legislature, underestimating the value of popular scrutiny
in a democracy and accordingly losing the wide-based support
required for sustainable cross-strait cooperation. Even though it now
dominates Taiwan’s legislature, the DPP, given the current strained
relations with China, has not begun to seriously promote the draft
Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Act that is required to lay the
groundwork for Taiwan’s future approval of cross-strait cooperation.
These short-sighted approaches of the main political actors are likely
to contribute to a vicious cycle in which law fails to play any
significant role in restoring cooperation and reducing tension.
We recognize the realistic challenges of promoting the rule of
law in cross-strait relations. Yet Beijing frequently urges other states
to adopt a long-term perspective, and both Beijing and Taipei have
continuing incentives to cultivate greater respect for their cross-strait
agreements in order to facilitate their lasting cooperation.
Unjustifiable non-compliance with these agreements undermines
their credibility. If these agreements can no longer be trusted, Beijing
will lose a valuable tool to exert its influence, enable cooperation with
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Taiwan and foster peaceful development in the region. Also,
although Beijing does not regard cross-strait agreements to be within
the ambit of international law, its persistent non-compliance will be
interpreted by others as further evidence of its disdain for the
international rules of the game. This cannot be in Beijing’s long-term
interest.
Taiwan, and countries that support its democratic progress,
should not miss this opportunity to encourage the PRC to respect, and
make use of, some of the most important and enduring rules and
institutions of the world community.
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